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Paul Palazzo's avatar

Spot on piece. As I’ve mentioned previously here, I’m as big a C’s fan as there is - have been going back to the late Cousy days. JB is a fine player, but he should never, ever be mentioned among the league’s elite. The Celtics will move him eventually because it will be extremely hard for them to win with him and JT in max slots, particularly with JT coming off the Achilles, which if nothing else will result in fewer minutes. As for Milwaukee, easy for me to say, but after giving the title team a year to defend, they should have pivoted by moving Jrue and Middleton or Lopez, restocking the assets account. Giannis would have been pissed, but they could have explained that they wanted him to have a title shot for the entirety of his career, not one or two years.

Aaron C Brown's avatar

Other than the collective bargaining agreement paragraph—which is clear and useful—I found this a frustrating post that can't decide if the glass is half-full or half-empty.

The headline claim, that the Bucks failed to sell high, is immediately undercut by the post's own caveats: the "prices" here are strategically leaked quotes, not fills. The asset is enormous and indivisible, the market is thin, and most of those rumored packages were floated by teams and agents with a reason to move the market—the author even flags the Luka offer as possible ass-covering for Harrison, then turns around and marks Giannis to exactly that kind of rumor. You can't sell high into a bid you were never going to be able to hit. Scoring the Bucks against a quote nobody could transact on is hindsight dressed as portfolio discipline.

Then, a few sections later, the opposite error: Jaylen Brown is "about as clean a sell-high window as you'll find"—immediately contradicted by the claim that his trade value can exceed his impact metrics because shot creation is scarce. Those can't both carry weight. The sell-high call needs the box score to be a mirage the market will overpay for; the scarcity hedge needs it not to be. The author commits to both answers in adjacent paragraphs.

The LaMelo Ball section is backwards—Minnesota is short vol in the deal, not long. They sold a put on their own performance to Charlotte via the swaps and the unprotected 2033 pick. They may well increase their expected wins, but the protection they gave away pays off worst in exactly the state where they'd most want their own picks back: the swaps convey precisely when Edwards bolts or LaMelo breaks down or the season otherwise craters. That's not diversifying variance, it's stacking it. The "long volatility" position here belongs to Charlotte.

Finally, the Garnett section is outcome-based analysis in an otherwise process-oriented column. It's a sample of one—selected on the fact that it won, which is the very reasoning the author flags as suspect one sentence later—and it highlights that fact. Where's the analysis of the aging-star-for-depth deals that cratered?

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